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Vhile rules of procedure designed for the federal courts
may not, in all respects, be suitable for use in the courts of a
state on account of differences in jurisdiction and organization,
many features of the new federal practice offer suggestions for
desirable improvements in the procedure of the state courts.
The principles embodied in the new federal rules were largely
derived from rules actually employed in various states in this
country, and in jurisdictions abroad, where the English common
law is administered. They were drafted with the definite pur-
pose of seeking and adopting the most effective methods of
solving the various procedural problems which had been suc-
cessfully tested in actual experience anywhere in the English
speaking world, and they contain comparatively few features
which are completely novel.
In framing the rules it was the aim to confine them as far
as possible to general operative principles, leaving details so far
as practicable to the discretion of the courts and to the judg-
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ment of counsel. Simplicity was sought as a primary quality in
order to remove the opportunities for technical objections and
arguments which are invariably produced by restrictions, lim-
itations, conditions, and exceptions. Vague phrases of uncertain
meaning and words which have proved troublesome in the past
were avoided, and fictional elements, heretofore so characteris-
tic of rules of procedure, were almost completely eliminated.
The final test to which all the rules were subjected was con-
venience and effectiveness, rather than logic or orthodox regu-
larity.
An enumeration of those features of the federal rules which
are of special interest as possible models for state practice,
should include at least the following:
I. FORM OF PROCEDURE
The federal rules go further than those of many states,
including Ohio, in reducing procedure to a single form. Ohio
still distinguishes between "actions" and "special proceedings."
The federal rules do not make this distinction but the same pro-
cedural methods are employed in all types of cases. Ohio has a
special procedure for mandamus, and probably for prohibition
which follows mandamus. Under the federal rules mandamus
is an ordinary civil action with no special rules to control it.
In the report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil
Procedure published in April, 1937, the single form of pro-
cedure was extended, as far as applicable, to proceedings for
condemnation of land. The rule regulating condemnation was
not retained in the final draft, and does not appear in the rules
as adopted by the Supreme Court, but the draft of a rule which
appears in the April report is an excellent model for a single
form of proceeding for condemnation based upon the general
plan of procedure in use in courts of general jurisdiction. Ohio
has ten different methods for condemnation, which could easily
be reduced to a single method based essentially upon the ordi-
nary civil action, as exemplified in the draft referred to.
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2. PLEADINGS
The word "facts" does not appear in the federal rules relat-
ing to pleadings, for the reason that that term has proved to be
a very troublesome one. There is no workable definition of a
"fact." The proper test of a good allegation should not be that
it alleges "facts" but that it gives adequate information. Under
the federal rules allegations will be deemed sufficient if they
supply whatever information is necessary to enable the opposite
party to plead or to prepare for trial. The simplicity and lack
of technicality contemplated in the drawing of pleadings is
illustrated by the model forms which are attached to the new
federal rules as an appendix. Some of the allegations in those
forms might be technically designated as conclusions of law,
rather than facts of the orthodox issuable type, but they fully
serve the purpose of giving information and are, therefore, con-
sidered suitable.
Allegations of legal capacity and corporate existence may be
omitted in stating the plaintiff's claim (Rule 9-a). There is
very rarely any dispute over either of them and it is thought
that convenience will be served by ignoring them in the first
instance and allowing the other party, in case he wishes to raise
an issue in regard to them, to present it by a negative averment.
This is an application of the same principle employed in the
common statute which permits a general allegation of perform-
ance of conditions precedent but requires the adverse party to
make a negative allegation as to performance of any condition
regarding which he wishes to raise an issue.
Hypothetical and alternative statements of claims or de-
fences are permitted (Rule 8-e). This merely recognizes that
a party's true position is often either a hypothetical or an alter-
native one and that the pleadings ought to frankly show it.
In order to secure honest denials so far as possible the fed-
eral rules require that each allegation shall be admitted or
denied and that a general denial shall not be used unless the
party in good faith intends to controvert every fact alleged in
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the opposite pleading. Such a situation will almost never occur.
As a matter of convenience qualified general denials, which are
directed to all facts not expressly admitted, are authorized, and
when one has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of an averment he is permitted to so state,
and this has the effect of a denial. In Ohio it seems that the
pleader is required to positively deny the facts in such a case
and then relieve his conscience by following his false and fic-
titious denial with a statement of his want of knowledge (State
ex rel. v. Commissioners, ii Ohio St. 183).
No general requirement for the verification of pleadings is
made by the federal rules. Sworn pleadings, as experience has
shown, are no more likely to be true than unsworn pleadings.
The federal rules have attempted to secure truthfulness in
pleading by another means. This is the requirement that every
pleading must have the personal signature of at least one lawyer
who is retained in the case and this signature, by the express
provision of the rules, constitutes a certification by him that he
has read the pleading, that there is good ground to support it,
and that it is not interposed for delay. For wilful violation of
this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate discipli-
nary action. In view of the futility of ordinary verifications of
pleadings, this plan of a certificate of counsel seems at least
worth trying.
There is no absolute requirement that different claims and
defences must be separately pleaded. Instead, it is provided
that separate counts and defences may be employed when such
action will facilitate clear presentation of the case (Rule io-b).
The use of separate counts often complicates the case and pro-
duces repetition and confusion. The flexible principle adopted
by the federal rules seems more convenient than the absolute
requirement of separate statements found in the Ohio Code
(Ohio Gen. Code, secs. 11,308, ii,316).
Inconsistency between counts or defences is declared by the
federal rules to be unobjectionable (Rule 8-e). The Ohio Code
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absolutely bars inconsistent defences (Code, sec. 11,315), and
the courts of Ohio have condemned inconsistent allegations
(Ass'n. v. O'Conner, 29 Ohio St. 65 I). The practical result of
a rigid prohibition of inconsistency is to victimize a party for
inability to accurately forecast evidence to which he may have
no access. This is essentially unfair. Apparent inconsistencies
are often really alternatives and are legitimately used to pro-
vide adequate allegations to meet the uncertainties of proof.
Even those courts which purport to condemn inconsistency
avoid actually doing so by holding that two allegations or de-
fences are inconsistent only when the proof of one tends to
disprove the other-a test under which inconsistency becomes
almost impossible. In other words the rule, being unfair, de-
feats itself.
3. JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION
The federal rules offer almost unlimited freedom of joinder
of causes of action. All claims by a plaintiff against a defendant
may be joined (Rule IS-a). In Ohio, as under most of the
codes, only those claims may be joined which fall within some
one of the arbitrary and specially enumerated classes. There is
no possible inconvenience which can result from pleading claims
together. It is only when different claims are tried together that
inconvenience may result, but the federal rules meet this situa-
tion by providing that an order for separate trials may be made
by the court whenever it would promote convenience.
Under the Ohio Code the parties must be the same in all
claims which are joined (Sec. 11,307), but no such requirement
is found in the federal rules. They permit joinder of claims
where the parties are not the same, provided (a) they arise out
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences, and (b) involve a common question of law or fact
(Rule 2o-a). Under this liberal rule of joinder it would be
possible to join claims for wrongful death against a person caus-
ing the original injury and a physician who subsequently treated
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the case; claims for deceit by many security buyers who relied
upon the same prospectus; claims by many shippers for goods
lost or damaged by the same act; claims in the alternative
against several tort feasors3 claims against an officer and his
surety and against the officer alone; claims against a defendant
individually and as an administrator; claims for a single loss by
fire against insurers liable upon several contracts; and as a
special instance it is expressly provided that one may join a
claim against defendant X for a judgment with a claim to set
aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance made by defendant X
to defendant Y (Rule I8-b).
4. COUNTERCLAIMS
Under most American statutes, including the Code of Ohio,
there are very severe restrictions upon the use of counterclaims.
Thus, under the Ohio Code (Secs. 11,317, 11,319) they are
restricted to claims arising out of the same transaction as the
plaintiff's claim, or transactions connected with the same subject
of action, or, in actions upon contracts, to cross claims also aris-
ing upon contract; and they are limited to claims by a de-
fendant against a plaintiff between whom a several judgment
might be had in the action. Under this language there can be
no counterclaim against one of a number of joint plaintiffs nor
by one of a number of joint defendants; nor can there be an inde-
pendent claim in tort pleaded against a claim either in tort or
contract, nor an independent claim in contract pleaded against a
claim in- tort, nor an independent claim in equity pleaded
against any claim. These restrictions and limitations are abol-
ished in the federal rules, which provide that any claim of any
kind by any defendant against any plaintiff may be used as a
counterclaim (Rule 13). All inconvenience which might other-
wise result from such unrestricted use of counterclaims is
avoided by the rule providing that the court may order separate
trials whenever convenience would be served thereby.
Under the federal rules counterclaims are either compul-
NEW FEDERAL RULES 149
sory or permissive. The compulsory counterclaim is one arising
out of the same transactioni all other counterclaims are permis-
sive. This distinction is based upon the principle of convenience
that all matters involved in the controversy ought to be deter-
mined in the same action. The Ohio Code, however, overlooks
this principle, and seeks to make all counterclaims compulsory
by denying costs to the plaintiff who brings a subsequent action
upon any claim which might have been used as a counterclaim
(Code, Sec. 11,624).
5. JOINDER OF PARTIES
Parties jointly interested must join. This is the universal
rule. But in dealing with parties not jointly interested the fed-
eral rules are far more liberal than those of most of the states.
They permit such parties to join or be joined if they assert or
there is asserted against them, jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, any right to relief arising out of the same trans-
action, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, if any
common question of law or fact will arise. This is merely the
general principle of equity which encouraged the determination
of the entire controversy in a single suit. Convenience in ad-
ministration is made the test of joinder. In Ohio, as under most
codes, joinder of parties not jointly interested is much more
restricted. Plaintiffs may join only if they are all interested in
the subject of the action and in the relief demanded-a provi-
sion of uncertain meaning which has given rise to a great deal
of litigation.
6. CLASS ACTIONS
Class actions are based upon three fundamental principles,
(I) the existence of too many parties to make it practical to
bring them all before the court; (2) adequate representation
by those who are present; and (3) community of interest
among all parties. The community of interest which is sufficient
for a class action may arise out of a joint or common right, or
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out of several rights in the same property involved in the action,
or out of several rights affected by a common question of law
or fact where common relief is sought. These are the principles
underlying class actions which are actually administered by the
courts. The federal rule authorizing class actions is based ex-
plicitly upon these principles, and is stated in language which is
clear and simple (Rule 23). The provision for class suits under
the Ohio Code, on the contrary, is very vague and difficult to
understand. It is as follows: "When the question is one of
common or general interest of many persons, or the parties are
very numerous and it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all."
(Code, sec. 1 1,257). This is the common code provision and it
has given rise to endless litigation. The terms "general inter-
est" and "many persons" which are employed in this provision
are words of uncertain meaning. Furthermore the provision
following the word "or" by its terms makes mere numbers and
impractibility of actual joinder sufficient by itself, without any
community of interest, sufficient for a class action. Taken liter-
ally the provision obviously is impossible to administer. Fur-
thermore the statute does not require adequate representation,
although this is certainly necessary for a class suit. Similar
provisions, found in various codes, have produced an extraordi-
nary amount of confusion. The federal rule is a simple state-
ment of actual judicial practice.
7. THIRD PARTY PROCEDURE
The federal rules provide that when a defendant is entitled
to indemnity or contribution from a third party, he may bring
in such party by leave of court and ask for a judgment against
him, and the third party will be bound both by the adjudication
of the main action and by the adjudication of the claim against
himself (Rule i4). England has used this practice since I875
and has found it convenient and effective (Order i6-A), New
York has employed it since 1922 (Civ. Prac. Act, sec. i93), and
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Wisconsin adopted it in 1935 (Stat. §26o.I9(I)). Its conveni-
ence is apparent.
8. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
Experience has demonstrated that pleadings can never,
under any system of rules, serve as an adequate means for dis-
closing whether there are real issues in the case or what they
are. Rules of pleading supply no test by which to distinguish
between fictitious issues and real issues, and a party never knows
from an inspection of the pleadings what points, if any, are
going to be brought into actual dispute at the trial. Further-
more, the issues shown upon the pleadings are subject to change
at any time by amendment. Many cases would be settled with-
out trial, and all would be simplified, if the actual facts were
understood by both parties. England undertook many years
ago to provide a method of looking beneath the pleadings to
discover the real points of issue (o. 38a). The parties were
brought before a master at a preliminary stage, by a so-calle-d
summons for directions, and were there interrogated regarding
various phases of the case for the purpose of ascertaining
whether there were any genuine issues, and if so what they
were, and mapping out the future course of the proceedings.
The success attained encouraged a gradual extension of the
scope of this preliminary inquiry. A report of the Royal Com-
mission on "The Dispatch of Business at Common Law," pub-
lished in 1936, recommended that it be broadened still further,
as a means of eliminating fictitious issues and bringing about
final settlements.
The federal rules have authorized a pre-trial procedure
somewhat similar to that employed in England by the summons
for directions. By Rule 16 any district court in its discretion
may in any case or by general rule provide for a pre-trial hear-
ing to consider the simplification of issues, amendments, admis-
sion of facts or documents, limitation of the number of expert
witnesses, references, and any other matters likely to aid in the
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trial of the cause. The order made at the pre-trial hearing will
control the subsequent course of the action, if the hearing does
not end in a final settlement of the case.
Pre-trial dockets have been established in a number of
American cities following the procedure first developed by the
Circuit Court of Wayne County, sitting in Detroit, Michigan.
The effectiveness of this practice has been striking. In 1935
that court tried 2949 cases and during the same year it finally
disposed of 2o16 cases on the pre-trial hearing (6th Rep. Jud.
Council of Mich., 43, 73). In Boston during a ten-months
period in 1935-36 the Superior Court tried 1562 cases and dur-
ing the same period disposed of 3075 cases on the pre-trial
docket (3rd Rep. Jud. Council of N. Y., 232).
9. DISCOVERY
Ohio has a broad and effective system of discovery but many
Ohio lawyers feel that it is frequently abused. Some of the
provisions found in the federal rules would ten'd to eliminate
such abuses, while others would extend the use of discovery
various ways.
The federal rules offer the alternative in every instance of
written interrogatories or oral examinations for discovery (Rule
26-a). Written interrogatories are much less expensive, are
entirely adequate in many situations, and should be freely avail-
able at the party's election.
The federal rules make express provision for a large variety
of protective orders where attempts are made to conduct the
discovery examination in such a way as to embarrass or annoy
either parties or deponents. Thus by Rule 3o-b the court in
which the action is pending may for good cause shown make an
order "that the deposition shall not be taken, or that it may be
taken only at some designated place other than that stated in
the notice, or that it may be taken only on written interroga-
tories, or that certain matters shall not be inquired into, or that
the scope of the examination shall be limited to certain matters,
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or that the examination shall be held with no one present except
the parties to the action and their officers or counsel, or that
after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order
of the court, or that secret processes, developments, or research
need not be disclosed, or that the parties shall simultaneously
file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed en-
velopes to be opened as directed by the court; or the court may
make any other order which justice requires to protect the party
or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression."
As a further protection the federal rules provide that an
answer may be compelled only by an order of the court and no
contempt process shall be employed until the order has been
disobeyed (Rule 37). If upon application to the court for such
an order it appears that the refusal was unjustified the cost of
the application for the order, including reasonable attorneys
fees, shall be assessed against the party or witness refusing to
answer or against counsel advising such refusal (Rule 37-a).
The federal rules authorize either party to serve upon the
other a written request for the admission of any relevant matter
of fact, or of the genuineness of any relevant document, and if
such admission is unjustifiably refused the party refusing shall
be required to pay the cost of proof, including reasonable attor-
neys fees (Rule 37-c).
If the party seeking discovery fails to attend the hearing or
fails to take proper steps to have his witness there, the court
may order him to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which he incurred in attending the hearing,
including reasonable attorneys fees (Rule 30-g).
Under the federal rules examination of tangible things and
of land may be had upon the order of the court (Rule 34), and
a physical or mental examination of a party may be ordered in
proper cases (Rule 35). Mutuality of disclosure is assured in
case of such mental and physical examination by the provision
that if the party examined at the instance of his adversary shall
request and obtain the physician's report of that examination,
he must, if requested, give to his adversary a report of any
other examination of the same physical or mental condition
which has been or shall be made at his own instance.
10. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
It frequently happens that although an issue of fact appears
upon the pleadings there is really no actual controversy in-
volved. If there is no genuine issue to be tried, the case ought
to be determined without sending it to trial. A pre-trial hearing
might disclose the situation. But a very convenient and effective
method has been employed in England and in more recent years
in New York, Michigan, Illinois, and some other states, for
determining upon affidavits whether there is any genuine issue
to be tried, and for summarily rendering a final judgment for
the party entitled to it in case no such issue exists. The federal
rules provide a very simple method for this purpose (Rule 56).
A motion with or without affidavits may be made by either
party, for a summary judgment, at any time after the answer
is filed. The adverse party may thereupon file opposing affi-
davits if he desires to do so. The court will then inspect the
record, including the pleadings, and all affidavits, depositions
or admissions on file, and if it appears that there is no genuine
issue to be tried and that the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law, a final judgment will then and there
be rendered.
I I. SPECIAL VERDICT
Special verdicts at common law were required to be sufficient
on their face to fully sustain the judgment rendered. It fol-
lowed that if any material fact were omitted or if the special
verdict contained, instead of a material fact, a mere conclusion
of law or mere matters of evidence, the party having the burden
of proof could not obtain a judgment upon it. The risk of
losing the judgment on account of some inadvertent omission
or on account of an error in the manner of stating the facts in
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the special verdict was so great that parties hesitated to employ
the special verdict, notwithstanding the great advantage which
it offered of relieving the jury from the difficult and hazardous
task of applying the law to the facts under general instructions
from the court. The federal rules have eliminated this risk by
providing that as to any matters not submitted or asked to be
submitted to the jury, the parties will be presumed to have
waived their right to trial by jury, and the court may make a
finding regarding such matter, or if it fails to do so, it shall be
deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment
which it renders on the special verdict (Rule 49-a). This is the
practice employed in Wisconsin and it has proved so successful
that the general verdict has become almost obsolete in that state.
12. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
The use of a motion for a directed verdict has been made
very useful and effective by a provision in the federal rules
that when such a motion, made at the close of all the evidence,
is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court shall be
deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a
later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion
(Rule 5o). This will enable the court to obtain the verdict of
the jury for subsequent use as the basis of a judgment if a
judgment upon the verdict ought to be rendered. But it will,
at the same time, enable the court, in case it shall conclude on
further investigation that the motion for a directed verdict
ought to have been sustained, to render a final judgment con-
trary to the verdict, instead of merely order a new trial as at
common law. This practice has been in use for many years in
a number of American states and has proved of great value.
There are many other features of the new federal rules
which contain interesting suggestions, such as the rules abolish-
ing demurrers, rules prescribing to what extent amendments
relate back to the date of the original pleading, rules for sub-
stitution of parties, for severance and consolidation of actions,
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for the use of masters. But enough has been said to indicate
the thorough-going way in which a simplified system of pro-
cedure has been worked out for the federal courts, and the
numerous opportunities for improving a somewhat conventional
state practice which a study of the federal rules may disclose.
